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Abstract. Alice&Bob notation is widely used to describe conversations
between partners in security protocols. We present a tool that compiles
an Alice&Bob description of a Web Services choreography into a set
of servlets. For that we first compute for each partner an executable
specification as prudent as possible of her role in the choreography. This
specification is expressed in ASLan language, a formal language designed
for modeling Web Services tied with security policies. Then we can check
with automatic tools that this ASLan specification verifies some required
security properties such as secrecy and authentication. If no flaw is found,
we compile the specification into Java servlets that real partners can use
to execute the choreography.
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1 Introduction
Alice&Bob notation (A&B) primarily intended for specifying Security Protocols
permits also to capture complex and secured standard conversations between
Web Services (WS’s). Figure 1 shows a choreography view of the Needham-
Schroeder Public Key security protocol (NSPK). In the following we discuss how
such conversations can be extracted from the specification files documenting the
services and the processes involved in a choreography.
1.1 Web Services
According to the Web Services Description Language (WSDL) a WS is defined
as a list of operations which can be called to use a computation or process-
ing skill proposed by the WS. These operations are organized into ports and
each port can be bound to one or different networks addresses (and possibly to
specific transport protocols). Each operation is described by giving the precise
XML structure of three messages: the request message the operation expects
when it is called, the response message the operation returns as a result of a
regular execution and the third is the error message returned after a faulty one.
Moreover security policies are possibly defined to constrain the use of a service.
They address different levels of protection targeting either the entire service,
a specific port, a given operation or even a specific message associated to an
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Fig. 1. The NSPK Choreography
operation. Within the WS-SecurityPolicy (WS-SP) standard, these policies can
express either the need to use secure transport protocols to communicate with
the service (e.g. SSL over HTTP) or the need for cryptographic protection for
the operations’ messages (using encryption or digital signature) but also for sat-
isfying some access control rules by requiring some certificates to be present in
the exchanged messages. Figure 2(a) shows a graphical representation of the
Key Server WS (S ). S exposes one operation called getKey which belong to a
default port (not represented). We represent here the XML patterns bound to
the input and output messages using first-order terms over a signature described
in § 2.1. Moreover a security policy is associated to S and targets the outbound
message of getKey which have to be digitally signed using a private key available
to the service: #0. More generally such policies may specify which parts of one
operation’s message have to be digitally signed and/or ciphered. These parts are
identified inside the corresponding XML schemata using XPATH [23] queries.
1.2 Business Processes
The Business Process Execution Language (BPEL) is an XML-based language
describing business processes (BP’s) as aggregation of WS’s interactions achiev-
ing particular goals. While an abstract BPEL specification describes only the
behavioral aspects of these interactions, e.g. following a specific order, an exe-
cutable BPEL specification (also called WS orchestration) may describe in ad-
dition internal actions that are performed by the process, e.g. applying basic
XML data transformation. An executable BPEL process can be executed by
an orchestration engine which performs the WS’s invocations and the internal
actions in the order specified in its BPEL specification. The process itself can
then be offered as a new WS, in this sense BPEL implements the composability
principle of SOA by encompassing an aggregation of WS operation calls into a
single one.
Figure 2(b) shows a graphical representation of P (S) a BP playing the NSPK
Choreography with partners P (A) and P (B). Each arrow represents a commu-
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Fig. 2. The Key Server
nication activity involving P (S). Annotations of the form getKey?Xi stands for
receptions of requests Xi targeting the getKey operation of the service S while
those of the form getKey!Xj stands for sending back the corresponding responses
Xj returned by getKey to the caller. The Xi’s are typed variables the orchestra-
tion engine manipulates during the process execution. These variables are either
initially instantiated or assigned to values carried by received messages or to new
values by applying simple XML transformations on already valuated variables.
For example the line keyReq(src(X2),trgt(X3)) := X1 freshly assigns the variables
X2 and X3 to the corresponding parts inside X1 which is implicitly supposed to
be of the correct type. In the line X6 == keyReq(src(X3),trgt(X2)) all the vari-
ables are already valuated and thus it represents a condition to check. This check
is important in order to play the NSPK Choreography correctly since P (S) have
to correlate the two requests w.r.t. the identities of the two partners P (A) and
P (B). Correlation is explicitly supported by BPEL and naturally introduces
the need of a multi-session handling which was not visible at WS level where
operations are serving their answers in a synchronous way.
A BPEL orchestration engine is not in charge of enforcing the security poli-
cies associated to the invoked services or to the executed process. This is too
restrictive from the general point of view of security protocols. Indeed it discards
processes that receive messages they cannot totally decipher at the moment of
reception but which could be more finely analyzed in a further step after receiv-
ing the right keys. The tool we propose in this paper overcomes this restriction
and permits thus to correctly handle such protocols. For this we need to take
into account the effect of the security policies on messages exchanged by the
process and we sketch in the following how we can proceed. First we reconstruct
from the BPEL process specification the terms ti corresponding to the XML
schematas of its exchanged messages mi. Each ti have its minimal subterms (or
leaves) ranging over a set of fresh variables. Then we identify in the ti variables
that correspond to the same value by analyzing the effect of the correlation rela-
tions and the internal actions (the assignments) of the process on themi. Finally
we apply to each ti the effect of the security policy attached to the operation of
mi. This amounts to first identify the subterms of ti corresponding to parts in
mi that have to be cryptographically protected and then to replace them in ti
by terms expressing this protection. For P (S) these transformations lead to the
following sequence of interactions:
1 ?msg( par (A) , opt ( getKey ) , pld ( keyReq ( s r c (Y1) , t r g t (Y2 ) ) ) )
2 ! msg( par (A) , opt ( getKey ) , pld ({ keyResp ( agt (Y2) , key (pk [Y2 ] ) ) } Y0 ) )
3 ?msg( par (B) , opt ( getKey ) , pld ( keyReq ( s r c (Y2) , t r g t (Y1 ) ) ) )
4 ! msg( par (B) , opt ( getKey ) , pld ({ keyResp ( agt (Y1) , key (pk [Y1 ] ) ) } Y0 ) )
where {#1} #2 (resp. #1[#2]) is a shorthand for the asymmetric encryption of
the message #1 by the key #2 (resp. a shorthand for apply(”#1”,#2)).
1.3 Choreographies
The choreography is a collaborative effort focused on exchange of messages from
a global point of view where all participating services are treated equally [7]. This
definition contrasts with the one for orchestration where a BPEL process is dis-
tinguished as a central coordinator of the WS’s interactions. The Web Services
Choreography Description Language (WS-CDL) [24] is a standard language that
permits to define multi-party contracts describing only the externally observable
behaviors of WS’s the description of the messages they exchange. WS-CDL mod-
els are not meant to be directly executed but are often used in conjunction with
executable BPEL models especially to implement choreographies. When this is
the case, the WS-CDL specification may be used to distinguish the subset of the
desired collaborations between a set of existing BPEL processes within the set of
all the possible ones. Indeed WS-CDL permits to define execution in sequence, in
parallel or in choice mode of structured and possibly (conditioned or repetitive)
abstract interactions which can be matched with local communication activities
of the involved BPEL processes.
For the NSPK Choreography the WS-CDL file simply interconnects in se-
quence the BPEL processes representing the involved partners: P (A), P (B) and
P (S). We claim that after collecting all the BPEL specifications involved in
the NSPK Choreography (and enriched by the effect of security policies on the
exchanged messages as explained in the end of § 1.2) and after analyzing the
WS-CDL specification file we obtain the result in Figure 1 which is a graphical
illustration of an A&B specification of the NSPK Choreography.
1.4 Contributions
We propose a tool that:
– translates an A&B specification of a WS choreography played by a set of
BP’s into its formal specification permitting its verification against classical
security properties (such as secrecy, authentication);
– compiles the A&B specification into Java servlets that partners can use to
execute the choreography as safely as possible.
We stress out here the fact that both results can be reused in the security
protocol world, obtaining thus an automated procedure permitting to formalize
protocols described using the A&B semi-formal notation but also to obtain their
operational implementations. Moreover the obtained formal specification and
Java servlets implement as prudently as possible the different business processes
involved in the choreography permitting to establish strong security guarantees
for the generated code (the prudence property is defined in § 3.1). Finally, we
show how in some interesting cases the prudence property is sufficient to use the
generated servlets in a multi-sessions-aware context.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in § 2 we provide the
different formal models considered by the tool. In § 3 we give the principle of our
translation procedure which we illustrate through experimentation in § 4 and we
finally conclude in § 5 by an overview of the related and prospective works.
2 Formal Models
2.1 Conversations
We use the A&B semi-formal notation to specify WS’s conversations. A conver-
sation is a sequence of messages exchanged by WS’s recorded in the order they
are to be sent [10]. We formally define it by the following grammar:
Conversation ::= TypeDec∗ Ik∗ Com∗
TypeDec ::= Type Msg : Typ
Ik ::= Ag knows Term ( ,Term)∗
Com ::= Ag − Op → Ag : Msg
Typ,Msg,Ag,Op ::= Term
Each line in the conversation is either an initial knowledge declaration ik for a
partner, a communication activity Com where two partners exchange a message
via a given operation or a type declaration TypeDec binding some message to
a type. We consider three basic types: message for general character strings,
bool for booleans and nat for integers. Partners, operations and messages are
represented here by the non-terminal symbol Term corresponding to first order
terms as defined below.
Terms We consider an infinite set of free constants C, an infinite set of variables
X and the set of function symbols defined below:
F =
{
nodenl , child
n
i
l
| i ≤ l ∈ N∗, n ∈ C
}
∪ {apply, scrypt, sdcrypt, crypt, dcrypt, inv, invtest}
We denote by T(F) (resp. T(F ,X )) the set of terms over F ∪ C (resp. F ∪
C ∪ X ). The former is called the set of ground terms (or messages) over F ,
while the latter is simply called the set of terms over F . A substitution σ is
an idempotent mapping from X to T(F ,X ) such that {x |σ(x) 6= x} is a finite
set. The application of a substitution σ to a term t (resp. a set of terms E) is
denoted tσ (resp. Eσ) and is equal to the term t (resp. E) where all variables x
have been respectively replaced by the term xσ.
An equational theory E is defined by a set E of equations u = v with u, v ∈
T(F ,X ). We write s =E t as the congruence relation between two terms s and
t. Terms are manipulated by applying operations on them. These operations
are defined by the set Fp = F \ {inv} called the set of public symbols. Their
semantics are defined with the EXML equational theory defined above:

sdcrypt(y, scrypt(y, x)) = x (Ds)
dcrypt(y, crypt(inv(y), x)) = x (Das)
childni
l
(nodenl (x1, . . . , xl)) = xi (P i
a
)
invtest(x, inv(x)) = ⊤ (Iv)
A context C[x1, . . . , xn] is a term in which all symbols are public and such
that its nullary symbols are the variables x1, . . . , xn. C[x1, . . . , xn] is also denoted
C when there’s no ambiguity and n is called its length. We define the application
of a context C of length n over the sequence of messages m1, . . . ,mn to be the
image of C[X1, . . . , Xn] by the substitution {Xj → mj}1≤j≤n.
XML messages An XML node is represented by a term nodenl (u1, . . . , ul)
where nodenl is a function symbol of arity l, n is the tag of the node, and the
ui are terms representing the children of the node. In order to model security
constraints holding over XML messages, we represent the usual cryptographic
primitives with the function symbols: scrypt/sdcrypt for symmetric encryption
and decryption, crypt/dcrypt for asymmetric encryption and decryption (used
also to represent digital signature and its verification), inv to denote key inverses
and invtest permitting to test whether a pair of terms {t, t′} verifies t′ = inv(t).
Finally we use the function symbol apply to represent the application of a given
function represented by a term f to a term t by the term apply(f, t).
2.2 Communication Scenarios
We now focus on the local behaviors of all partners involved in the choreography.
We call such a behavior a partner and use strands [17] a standard notion in
cryptographic protocol modeling to describe it. These notions are defined below.
Definition 1. A strand s is a finite sequence of messages each labelled with !
or ?. The size of the sequence is called the length of s and messages with label !
(resp. ?) are said to be “sent” (resp.“received”). A strand is positive if and only
if all its labels are ?. For any strand s = !?m1, . . . ,
!
?mn, the length of s denoted
by length(s) is n.
Given a strand s = !?m1, . . . ,
!
?mn we also denote in the following respectively
by si and si the prefix of length i of s and the message mi.
Definition 2. A partner is a triplet (n, IK, s) where n is a constant called the
name, IK is a set of messages called the initial knowledge and s is a strand
called the communication scenario.
Given a conversation we proceed by end-point projection [11] to collect the
local behaviors of all the involved partners. This amounts to collecting first
all the participating partner names and their respective initial knowledge from
the conversation’s Ik items. Then an iteration through all the Com items per-
mits to build the communication scenarios as follows: if Com is p1 − o →
p2 : m then append to the communication scenario of p1 and p2 respectively
!msg(par(p2), opt(o), pld(m)) and ?msg(par(p1), opt(o), pld(m)), where node
msg
3 ,
nodepar1 , node
opt
1 and node
pld
1 are wrapping function symbols permitting to hold
the other partner’s name in the communication activity, the called operation
in addition to the exchanged message (the payload). Since our objective is to
provide an executable implementation for a given role we need to keep track of
these information for all its communication activities in order to compute the
network address of the receiver in the case of an emission or the called operation
in the case of a reception
For example, given the conversation of Fig. 1, our algorithm computes a
partner P (S) = (S, {pk[S], inv(pk[S])}, s) where s is the strand:
1 ?msg( par (A) , opt ( getKey ) , pld ( keyReq ( s r c (A) , t r g t (B) ) ) )
2 ! msg( par (A) , opt ( getKey ) ,
3 pld ({ keyResp ( agt (B) , key (pk [B] ) ) } i nv (pk [ S ] ) ) )
4 ?msg( par (B) , opt ( getKey ) , pld ( keyReq ( s r c (B) , t r g t (A) ) ) )
5 ! msg( par (B) , opt ( getKey ) ,
6 pld ({ keyResp ( agt (A) , key (pk [A] ) ) } i nv (pk [ S ] ) ) )
2.3 The ASLan Language
ASLan [3] (see also Appendix 6.1) is a formal language for specifying security-
sensitive service-oriented architectures, the associated security policies, as well
as their trust and security properties. We translate partners into ASLan roles
where an ASLan role is defined by a transition system and an initial state.
States are sets of facts, where facts are first order terms over a given signature.
By convention, some facts in the states are used to hold the knowledge of a role r:
state r(step, knowledge) whereas some others are used to signal a new message
emission: iknows(scrypt(k,m)). A transition τ is defined by two sets of facts:
its left and right hand sides denoted respectively by LHS(τ) and RHS(τ). A
transition τ may bring some state s to a state s′, if LHS(τ) can be unified with
a subset of s (via some substitution σ). Then s′ is defined to be (sσ\LHS(τ)σ)∪
RHS(τ)σ. The language allows also to guard the transitions by conditions like
equality (equal(t, t′)) between terms (t, t′).
3 Compilation Procedure
We present in the following a compilation procedure to translate partners to
ASLan roles. In § 3.1 we give an execution model for partners then in § 3.3 we
provide a concrete solution to generate their executable implementations and
finally in § 3.3 we show how these implementations are expressed in ASLan.
3.1 Execution model
To provide an executable implementation of Partner p we need to analyze which
values can be extracted by p from her received messages and specify how these
values should be processed by her to construct the next messages to be sent. Since
conversations involve cryptographically-protected messages one has to take into
account information asymmetries introduced by this protection. For example if
two partners exchange a cipher-text scrypt(k, t), they may be seeing it differently
if only one of them detains the deciphering key k. Since one of our objectives is
to provide an executable implementation for a given partner p this point turns
out to be critical in our case. Note that this aspect was not considered by related
works like [11] on end-point projection.
Our approach can be seen as an application of [15] where informally speak-
ing an implementation of a communication scenario specifies the set of public
symbols a partner has to apply to its current knowledge in order to construct the
messages she has to send according to the scenario. A prudent implementation
performs in addition all possible checks or security verifications by analyzing and
correlating all received messages by her at that point.
We illustrate these notions by commenting a prudent implementation of the
partner P (S) given below (and where pi−n is a shortcut for childni
l
):
1 Step .0={X0:=pk ; X1:=Ks ; X2:= inv (Ks)}
2 Step .1={ r e c e i v e (X3) on getKey ;
3 X4:=p1−keyReq (X3 ) ; X5:=p1−s r c (X4 ) ;
4 X6:=p2−keyReq (X3 ) ; X7:=p1−t r g t (X6 ) ;
5 X8:= s r c (X7 ) ; X9:= t r g t (X5 ) ; X10:=keyReq (X8 ,X9 ) ; X11:=agt (X7 ) ;
6 X12:=apply (X0 ,X7 ) ; X13:=key (X12 ) ; X14:=keyResp (X11 , X13 ) ;
7 X15:= crypt (X2 ,X14 ) ; X16:=agt (X5 ) ; X17:=apply (X0 ,X5 ) ;
8 X18:=key (X17 ) ; X19:=keyResp (X16 , X18 ) ; X20:= crypt (X2 , X19)}
9 Step .2={ send (X15) to X5}
10 Step .3={ r e c e i v e (X21) on getKey ; X21?=X10}
11 Step .4={ send (X20) to X7}
For example, in Step.0, P (S) initializes her knowledge by the function symbol
pk and her public and private keys. Step.1 corresponds to her first reception
targeting the operation getKey and where the received message is stored in the
variable X3. Lines 3−4 describe how parts are extracted from X3. For example
in line 4, X6 is assigned the second child of X3. All the messages that could be
further used by P (S) are precomputed by her as soon as possible thus reducing
sending steps to emitting precomputed values (like in Step.2 and Step.4). We note
that P (S) being in Step.1 is also able to precompute the message corresponding
to her next expected reception. Then in Step.3 the received message (stored in
X21) is compared with the precomputed expected value stored in X10. This
check is not necessary to the execution of P (S), since X20 the message to be
sent by her before finishing her task is already precomputed. Ignoring this test
we still result in an executable implementation of P (S) which is not prudent i.e.
one that does not check its input messages as thoroughly as possible.
3.2 Solution principle
A conversation does not explicitly specify what parts of a message being received
by a partner should be extracted by him and in which order. Similarly it does
not give information on how a message being sent by some partner is effectively
constructed given its current knowledge. The approach proposed in [15] is to
extract this information from a conversation and reduces the problem to classical
decision problems in protocol analysis, namely the reachability and the finite
basis problems. In this approach the conversation is projected on every partner
to generate her view. Then for each partner p (with s its communication scenario)
the following analysis is performed:
Sending case for all sent message mi find a context C, i.e. a sequence of op-
erations that permit to construct mi given all the messages received so far
m1, . . . ,mi−1. If such a context exists we say that mi is reachable by p and
we call C an extraction context for mi from the communication scenario s. We
then extend this definition to any subterm of s. If for all sent message mi there
exists a context Ci such that Ci[m1, . . . ,mi−1] =EXML mi, s is said executable
and one is given an operational implementation of it, provided that all the public
symbols functions are implemented.
Reception case for all message mi compute a finite generating set of all the pairs
of contexts C,C ′ such that the equality C[m1, . . . ,mi] =EXML C
′[m1, . . . ,mi]
holds. This finite set if it exists is called the finite basis of the communication
scenario si. If this computation succeeds for all received messages mi then one
can obtain a prudent implementation of s by checking after each reception mi
the messages relations specified by the finite basis.
3.3 Solving the problem
Our approach is an application of [15] to the EXML equational theory and is
summarized below. Given a communication scenario s we first look for extraction
contexts for all subterms of s. Since the sent messages are particular subterms
we can obtain an implementation of s. For that we first define a reachability
relation.
Definition 3. Given a term t a partner p = (n, IK, s) and a step i at most equal
to the length of s. We consider a list 〈m1, . . . ,ml〉 of messages in the union of
IK and the set of all received messages in sl. We say that t is reachable by p at
step i if there is a context C such that C[m1, . . . ,ml] =EXML t (and also that C
is an extraction context for t from p).
We also define the function reach as follows:
reach(p, t) = {min(i) | t is reachable by p at step i}
Given a partner p we compute all the subterms reachable by p at all steps of its
communication scenario. For that we introduce the notion of sequents to store
relations holding between subterms of p.
Definition 4. Given a partner p = (n, IK, s) we call γ a sequent of p (and
denote it by t1, . . . , tk ⊢f t0) an equality t0 =EXML f(t1, . . . , tk) where f is a
public symbol and t0, . . . , tk is a possibly empty sequence of subterms of s. We
call respectively t0, f and the sequence t1, . . . , tk the head, the symbol and the
tail of γ and denote them respectively by h(γ), s(γ) and t(γ).
We say that γ is valid at some step i when for all 0 ≤ j ≤ k, reach(p, tj) ≤ i.
We denote the set of all sequents of p by Γ (p) and the set of all valid sequents
at some step i by Γi(p). If a sequent γ is valid at step i then its head is also
reachable at step i by taking f(C1, . . . , Ck) as an extraction context for t0 from
p, assuming that C1, . . . , Ck are respectively extraction contexts for t1, . . . , tk.
We now solve the reachability and the finite basis problems for a given partner
p = (n, IK, s). First we compute Γ (p) by running through all the subterms of
s and collecting the corresponding sequents. For example a subterm of the form
t = scrypt(k,m) will provide two entries: k,m ⊢scrypt t and k, t ⊢sdrcypt m. For
each computed sequent γ we define an integer called its readiness and initially
set to the size of t(γ). This integer is used to compute the validity of a sequent
as explained further in this paragraph. We also define for each subterm t of s a
list of sequents sequents(t) which is initialized by all the sequents γ′ such that t
appears in the tail of γ′. The detailed solution is illustrated by Algorithm 1 which
relies on Algorithm 2 and both are given below.
The idea is to perform a fix-point computation per each step i corresponding to
the set Γi(p). We start from subterms that are trivially reachable at some given
step: elements in the initial knowledge which are all reachable at the initial
step 0 and all the received messages clearly reachable at their corresponding
reception step and try to deduce the newly reachable ones by checking whether
there exists some sequents having their tails made only of reachable subterms.
In order to select these sequents we make use of the readiness field attached to
each sequent which is decremented each time one element in its tail is discovered
to be reachable (Algorithm 2, line 4). Since the readiness field is initialized by
the cardinality of its tail thus whenever γ.readiness equals zero at some step
then the sequent is also valid at that step.
First, Algorithm 1 solves the the reachability problem since the value of
reach(p, t) is computed for all subterms of s. Second the sets Γi(p) computed for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ length(s) permit one to build a finite basis for all prefixes sj where s is
the communication scenario of p, namely the sets {h(γ)
?
= s(γ)(t(γ))|γ ∈ Γi(p)}
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ length(s). We emphasize here the redundancy of these finite
basis, since Γi−1(p) ⊆ Γi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ length(s). This means that all the
checks corresponding to sequents that are valid at some step are performed
again in all the subsequent steps. We let new(p, i) be the subset of elements in
Γi(p) \ Γi−1(p) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ length(s). The set new(p, i) contains sequents
that are valid only at step i and can be used as an optimized finite basis for
the prefix si provided that new(p, k) is also used as a finite basis for sk for all
1 ≤ k ≤ i− 1.
Algorithm 1 runs in linear time in the size of p represented as a directed
acyclic graph (DAG) since the number of instructions performed by the algo-
rithm is proportional to the sum of the sizes of IK and s represented as DAGs.
ASLan generation We shortly describe our procedure and leave the technical
details in Appendix 6.2. Given a partenr p = (n, IK, c) we propose to generate
its corresponding ASLan role r(p). First we associate a unique fresh variable
name Xi for each reachable subterm ti. These variables Xi will represent the
parameters of the state n fact. Then we define the initial state of r(p) which will
contain a state n fact where all the variableXj corresponding to values in IK are
respectively replaced by these values. Finally we compute the transition system
describing the communication behavior of r(p). Each step is then translated to
an ASLan transition that reflects the communication activity and the partner’s
knowledge evolution through the use of variablesXi while being possibly guarded
by equality conditions involving these variables. We provide in Appendix 6.3 the
ASLan specification obtained for the partner P (S).
4 Experimental Results
This section is organized as follows: in § 4.1 we describe the deployment target
for the prudent implementations obtained in § 3.3 then in § 4.2 we explain how
our solution can be adapted for a multi-session setting and finally in § 4.3 we
present an application of our approach for generating runnable Java distributions
for mediators leading WS’s orchestrations.
4.1 From ASLan to servlets
We propose to realize each partner by a java servlet partially described below.
1 c l a s s Partner extends HttpServ le t {
2 St r ing [ ] X; i n t s tep ;
3 void d i spatch ( St r ing msg){
4 i f ( accept (msg ) ){ s tep++; sendRemaining ( ) ; }
5 }
6 }
First the array X is a holder for all the variables Xi defining the state of the
considered role and the step field is an integer pointing to the current execution
step already reached by the role. The core of the servlet is the dispatch method
which is the handler of the received messages. dispatch supplies the received
message msg to the accept method (not represented) which returns a positive
answer only when (i) the step field corresponds to a reception activity and (ii)
msg matches the parsing and the possibly inherent checks for the step step. In
this case accept updates the array X possibly with newly computed values before
returning. Then dispatch increments the step counter and calls sendRemaining
(not represented) which is in charge of sending any message required to be sent
by the role till reaching the next reception step or the end of the communication
scenario.
We note that the code for the accept method can be easily generated from
the ASLan specification by transforming each equality condition appended to a
reception transition either to the instantiation of a new variable or to the check
of a certain relation between already valuated variables. For example the portion
of code to be executed by the method accept at step=3 is the following:
1 i f (msg . equa l s (X[ 1 0 ] ) ) {X[ 2 1 ] = msg ; re turn ( t rue ) ; }
4.2 Multi-session handling
Let us remark that the servlet presented in § 4.1 is not able to handle different
interleaved sessions of the corresponding role. We propose here to leverage this
restriction by modifying the generated servlet which now will hold a list of pairs
(X, step) representing the different sessions’ states. We have then to define a
dispatch strategy telling the servlet how messages are routed to the right sessions.
As discussed in [19] a naive strategy can be applied if one is assured that all
messages received by a partner have a distinguishing value (uniquely originating
nonces) that is reachable by the partner at the reception step and such that
it unambiguously defines the targeted session. Given this assumption and the
prudence of the implementation we provide, one can use a naive yet correct
algorithm to dispatch messages: try all the sessions for consuming an incoming
message. Assuming that every reception leads to computing a distinguishing
value and that the implementation performs all the possible correlation checks
upon receptions we can be sure that at most one session is candidate to consume
an incoming message and we call this property unique dispatch (UD).
We finally note that the NSPK protocol does not have the UD property,
since P (S) receives messages that does not contain distinguishing values (even
if all other partners do). Nevertheless if every partner plays his expected part in
the interleaving of two sessions of the NSPK protocol then P (S) still reaches a
satisfactory state where she also ends up correctly her two sessions. Therefore
we think our approach stays applicable and globally correct even if the distin-
guishing value assumption is relaxed.
4.3 Testing benchmark
In this section we describe a direct application of our approach for generating a
prudent implementation for a mediator leading an orchestration between WS’s.
In previous works [14, 13] we presented an automated approach for solving
an orchestration problem which we informally define here as synthesizing a new
service we call a mediator permitting to answer all the requests of a given client
while relying on a community of available services. Services are represented as
security protocol roles and the orchestration problem is then encoded as the
reachability of a satisfying state of the client starting from a configuration con-
taining the community of services and given Dolev-Yao intruder capabilities for
the mediator. This problem can be solved by a variety of tools from the security
protocol literature and we choose CL-Atse [22] (a constraint-solver) for this task.
The result returned by CL-Atse contains an A&B description of the communi-
cation (the intruder acting as) the mediator has to perform with (a subset) of
the community of WS’s and the client to effectively answer all the requests of
the latter.
We propose to reuse the approach presented in this paper to (i) generate
an ASLan description of the mediator and (ii) generate the mediator’s BPEL
process and thus permit leading and using the newly discovered orchestration.
Objective (i) has been already fulfilled and our approach has been implemented
and integrated to the AVANTSSAR Validation Platform [5]. Concerning (ii)
we recall that all the generated mediators could not be brought to standard
implementations and we stress the fact that our approach could at least answer
the problem in a standard way whenever this is possible.
We successfully assessed our tool against three case-studies from the test li-
brary [4] of the AVANTSSAR platform putting the focus on those representing
orchestration problems. Our tool generated and deployed all the servlet needed
by all the partners involved in each case-study and we effectively observed the
conversation taking place between servlets as intended by the A&B specifica-
tions.
These case-studies tackle several aspects of security (e.g. probative value of
digitally signed documents) and interoperability concerns and are summarized
below:
– Digital Contract Signing (DCS): DCS represents a contract signing proce-
dure carried out by two partners through secure access to a trusted third
party web site, a business portal.
– Public Bidding (PB): PB illustrates a secure document exchange, and aims
at providing a web portal to manage an online call for tender, and also
Bidders’ proposal submissions.
– Car Registration Process (CRP): CRP models an e-government scenario,
where a citizen have a secure access point, enabling communication with
government offices and service providers in an easily usable and secure way.
Table 1 illustrates the obtained results for each case-study and for our running
example where CS is the name of the case-study, SIZE is the the sum of the
sizes of all the partners, AGT (resp. SGT ) is the time needed to generate the
ASLan specification (resp. the Java servlets) for the case-study and finally AET
(resp. SET ) is the time needed to execute the generated ASLan specification
(resp. the time needed by the generated Java servlets to end up a session).
Table 1. Tool Execution Times
CS SIZE AGT SGT AET SET CS SIZE AGT SGT AET SET
NSPK 166 163 ms 1 s 708 ms 30 s PB 596 4 s 2 s 18 m 1 m
DCS 340 659 ms 2 s 3 m 1 m CRP 790 3 s 3 s 4 m 2 m
5 Conclusions
We present a tool that compiles an Alice&Bob description of a WS’s choreog-
raphy into their formal models enabling their automatic verification and if the
models are secure into a set of java servlets that real partners can use to exe-
cute securely the choreography. We also developed a web application version of
the tool that permits particularly to automatically deploy the servlets generated
from an A&B specification provided through a web form.
5.1 Related works
Several works in the literature addressed the problem of translating A&B spec-
ifications of security protocols to formal languages in order to enable their veri-
fication or execution.
In [12] the authors translates A&B to CKT5 [9], a modal logic of communi-
cation, knowledge and time supporting symmetric encryption and thus adapted
for security protocols. This permits to obtain a complete formal specification of
the protocol, describing in particular the internal actions that should be taken
by the involved partners to play their respective roles while enforcing a property
equivalent to prudence [15].
In [21] the author translates a variant of the A&B notation defined over an
arbitrary algebraic theory to the IF [6] formal language which is at the basis
of ASLan. Using explicit destruction symbols this translation defines unambigu-
ously how the protocol is supposed to be executed by honest agents according
to algebraic properties of the operators. In this sense, this work is very close to
ours and we can reuse its results (in particular the decidability of the finite ba-
sis problem in presence of algebraic reasoning) to extend our approach to cover
using the XOR operator or modular exponentiation.
In [8] the authors propose a high-level language for specifying multiparty
sessions and a compiler translating these high-level specifications to the crypto-
graphic protocols implementing them. The considered sessions specify patterns
of the message exchanges between distributed partners and their data accesses
to a common database while ignoring their local behaviors and internal actions.
The compiler then adds custom cryptographic protections to ensure authen-
tication, integrity and freshness of the exchanged messages and generates the
(ML) code for sending and receiving messages while enforcing the required cryp-
tographic operations and type checks against an active adversary. The main
differences with our approach is that (i) we consider executable choreographies
and generate ready to run programs implementing them and (ii) we do not add
security protection to the messages exchanged within the choreography in order
to enforce security properties but rather permit the modeler to check whether
her existing message-level policies are sufficient to enforce these properties by
providing a verifiable formal specification of the choreography.
In [20] the authors generate Java code to implement cryptographic network
protocols specified in CAPSL [16]. The output includes code for each party and
for a demonstration environment that permits user examination and control
of communication. The generated code relies on Standard Java cryptographic
providers (which at the time was not supporting public key cryptography).
In [19] the authors describe a compiler that uses constraint-based analysis to
produce multi-session server programs from cryptographic protocols formalized
in CPPL [18]. The compilation succeeds whenever each message received by an
agent playing the protocol contains a distinguishing value that can be extracted
by the agent at the moment of reception. We reuse their compilation success
criteria to analyze whether all partners have the UDP property before safely
using our naive dispatch strategy.
5.2 Future works
We conclude by a non-exhaustive list of possible extensions of the current work
which we leave for future works:
– provide prudent implementations supporting WS standards. To be more ex-
pressive in this direction we consider also generating enhanced SOAP engines
for partners that possibly mixes cryptographic treatment and XML parsing.
– extend the notion of prudent implementation to non-linear roles, e.g. by
allowing roles to branch on dis-equalities between subterms;
– sharpen the cryptographic functions definitions, e.g. parametrize crypt by
the algorithm used (RSA for the current version) and any other parameter
like the key size (current RSA key default length is 2048);
– support more cryptographic primitives (e.g. XOR).
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6 Appendix
6.1 ASLan Overview
Background 1 ASlan (AVANTSSAR Specification Language) is defined by ex-
tending the Intermediate Format (IF) [6]. IF is an expressive language for spec-
ifying security protocols and their properties, based on multiset rewriting. As
described in detail in [1], ASLan extends IF with a number of important features
so as to express diverse security policies, security goals, communication and in-
truder models at a suitable abstraction level, and thereby allow for the formal
specification and analysis of complex services and service-oriented architectures.
Most notably, ASLan extends IF with support of Horn clauses and LTL for-
mulas. For instance invariants of the system can be defined by a set of (definite)
Horn clauses. Horn clauses allow us not only to capture the deduction abilities
of the attacker in a natural way, but also, and most importantly, they allow
for the incorporation of authorization logics in specifications of services. More-
over, complex security properties can be specified in Linear Temporal Logic. As
shown, for instance, in [2], this allows us to express complex security goals that
services are expected to meet as well as assumptions on the security offered by
the communication channels.
Syntax and Semantics Here, we recall the main features of ASLan, pointing
the reader to [3] for more details on the language.
An ASLan file consists of several sections, among which:
Section Inits contains one or more initial states of the transition system. A state
of a transition system is a set of variable-free facts.
Section Rules specifies the transitions of the transition system. A transition is
a rule containing two parts, a left-hand side (LHS) and right-hand side (RHS).
The rule can fire in a state whenever its LHS holds in that state. Moreover, a
transition can be labeled with a list of existentially quantified variables whose
purpose is to introduce new constants representing fresh data (e.g. nonces).
Example 1. Sample transition.
1 step sampleTransition(BankAgent):=
2 state_BankingService(BankAgent ,1).
3 iknows(request)
4 =>
5 state_BankingService(BankAgent ,2).
6 iknows(response)
where
1 excerpts from [3]
– step is a keyword used to define a new transition;
– sampleTransition is a transition name;
– BankAgent is a parameter of the transition;
– state BankingService(BankAgent,1), iknows(request),
state BankingService(BankAgent,2), iknows(response) are facts;
– state BankingService(BankAgent,1).iknows(request) is the LHS of the transi-
tion;
– state BankingService(BankAgent,2).iknows(response) is the RHS of the transi-
tion.
This transition represents the behavior of a banking service that receives
a request and then reacts by replying with a response and moving to another
state. More precisely, the transition can be fired if there exists a value val of
variable BankAgent such that state BankingService(val,1) and iknows(request) are
in the current state. The result of firing the transition is to replace the fact
state BankingService(val,1) by the fact state BankingService(val,2) and add a new
fact iknows(response).
Message sending and receiving are specified using iknows facts: the iknows in
the LHS of a transition stands for receiving a message, while in the RHS of a
transition it stands for sending a message. The fact iknows(request) of Example 1
will not disappear from the current state, because the predicate iknows is per-
sistent: once a message is emitted, it becomes a part of the knowledge of the
environment (i.e., of the network or of the intruder) and the environment does
not “forget” it.
If the LHS of a transition holds in the current state, then it is assumed that
the knowledge (represented by a set of ground facts) of the corresponding service
is enough to build the messages stated in iknows in the RHS of the transition.
In order to specify service states, we use one predicate per service. By con-
vention the predicate name starts with state followed by the service name, e.g.
state BankingService from Example 1.
Section Goals contains security goals that can be defined as attack states (special
states of the transition system) or by means of LTL formulae.
Example 2. Sample attack state.
1 attack_state stateName(Msg):=
2 fact1(Msg).
3 fact2(Msg)
Here, attack state stateName is reached, if there exists a value val of variable
Msg such that fact1(val) and fact2(val) are in the current state of the transition
system.
Section HornClauses contains a finite set of Horn clauses. They can specify, for
instance, the authorization logic.
6.2 ASLan generation details
We give here the details of the ASLan generation procedure introduced at the
end of § 3.3.
For each partner p = (n, IK, c) we build a transition system specified in
ASLan and representing a prudent implementation of p. First we consider a
list A = 〈a1, . . . , an〉 of all the subterms of c reachable by p such that for all
1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, reach(p, ai) ≤ reach(p, aj) and we associate a fresh variable
name per each atom in A through a bijective mapping σ−1 : ai 7→ Xi. We then
create a state fact state n for p with the following profile type:
type(a1) ∗ . . . ∗ type(an)→ fact
For each reception ?msg(par(pa), opt(op), pld(m)) in c we generate an ASLan
transition τ having only the fact iknows(σ−1(m)) in its RHS. We note that
σ−1(m) is well defined, since every message m received by p is trivially reachable
by her. For each emission !msg(par(pa), opt(op), pld(m)) in c we generate an
ASLan transition τ having only the fact iknows(σ−1(m)) in its LHS. Again we
note here that if c is executable then every message m sent by the partner is
reachable and thus σ−1(m) is well defined.
We introduce the variable renaming functions {V Namej}1≤j≤length(c) to
distinguish whether a value has been effectively assigned to the variable Xm
or not yet in a transition. For each transition labeled by step j we respec-
tively append to its LHS and RHS the facts state n(〈V Namej−1(Xi)〉1≤i≤n)
and state n(〈V Namej(Xi)〉1≤i≤n) where the functions V Namej map variables
to ASLan variable names as follows:
V Namej(Xi) =
{
NI Xi, if reach(p, σ(Xi)) ≥ j;
Xi, otherwise.
If the considered transition labeled by j corresponds to a reception, we ap-
pend to its LHS all conditions of the form equal(σ−1(t0), f(σ
−1(t1), . . . , σ
−1(tk)))
where t1, . . . , tk ⊢f t0 ∈ new(p, j). If the transition corresponds to an emission,
we possibly guard it by conditions expressing the creation of a set of fresh nonces.
These nonces correspond to all the values that are not reachable by the partner
before the emission step and are bound in the transition to the set of variables
Xk such that reach(p,Xk) = j. Finally we specify the initial state of the partner:
state n(〈name(Xi)〉1≤i≤n) where the functions CNamej transform variables to
ASLan constant names as follows:
CNamej(Xi) =
{
ni Xi, if reach(p, σ(Xi)) > 0;
σ(Xi), otherwise.
Informally speaking we initialize (with dummy values) the variables correspond-
ing to atoms that does not appear in the initial knowledge of p but rather will be
seen in received messages or generated as nonces in messages to be sent. On the
other hand, variables corresponding to the atoms seen in the initial knowledge
will be instantiated by the values specified by the modeler.
6.3 ASLan Specification of P (S)
1%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
2 s e c t i o n s i gna tu r e :
3%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
4 keyReq : message∗message−>message
5 p1 keyReq : message−>message
6 p2 keyReq : message−>message
7 s r c : message−>message
8 p1 s r c : message−>message
9 t r g t : message−>message
10 p1 t r g t : message−>message
11 keyResp : message∗message−>message
12 p1 keyResp : message−>message
13 p2 keyResp : message−>message
14 agt : message−>message
15 p1 agt : message−>message
16 key : message−>message
17 p1 key : message−>message
18 msg : message∗message∗message−>message
19 p1 msg : message−>message
20 p2 msg : message−>message
21 p3 msg : message−>message
22 par : message−>message
23 p1 par : message−>message
24 opt : message−>message
25 p1 opt : message−>message
26 pld : message−>message
27 p1 pld : message−>message
28
29 s t a t e S :
30 nat∗ hash func ∗message∗message∗
31 keyReq ( s r c ( message ) , t r g t ( message ) )∗
32 s r c ( message )∗message∗
33 t r g t ( message )∗message∗
34 s r c ( message )∗ t r g t ( message )∗
35 keyReq ( s r c ( message ) , t r g t ( message ) )∗
36 agt ( message )∗message∗key (message )∗
37 keyResp ( agt ( message ) , key ( message ) )∗
38 crypt (message ,
39 keyResp ( agt ( message ) , key ( message ) ) ) ∗
40 agt ( message )∗message∗key (message )∗
41 keyResp ( agt ( message ) , key ( message ) )∗
42 crypt (message ,
43 keyResp ( agt ( message ) , key ( message ) ) ) ∗
44 keyReq ( s r c ( message ) , t r g t ( message ) )
45−>f a c t
46%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
47 s e c t i o n types :
48%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
49 execOK : message
50 getKey : message
51 pk : hash func
52 ks : message
53 dummy: message
54 X0 : hash func
55 X1 : message
56 X2 : message
57 X3 : keyReq ( s r c ( message ) , t r g t ( message ) )
58 X4 : s r c ( message )
59 X5 : message
60 X6 : t r g t ( message )
61 X7 : message
62 X8 : s r c ( message )
63 X9 : t r g t ( message )
64 X10 : keyReq ( s r c ( message ) , t r g t ( message ) )
65 X11 : agt ( message )
66 X12 : message
67 X13 : key ( message )
68 X14 : keyResp ( agt ( message ) , key ( message ) )
69 X15 : crypt (message ,
70 keyResp ( agt ( message ) , key ( message ) ) )
71 X16 : agt ( message )
72 X17 : message
73 X18 : key ( message )
74 X19 : keyResp ( agt ( message ) , key ( message ) )
75 X20 : crypt (message ,
76 keyResp ( agt ( message ) , key ( message ) ) )
77 X21 : keyReq ( s r c ( message ) , t r g t ( message ) )
78 NI X3 : keyReq ( s r c ( message ) , t r g t ( message ) )
79 NI X4 : s r c ( message )
80 NI X5 : message
81 NI X6 : t r g t ( message )
82 NI X7 : message
83 NI X8 : s r c ( message )
84 NI X9 : t r g t ( message )
85 NI X10 : keyReq ( s r c ( message ) , t r g t ( message ) )
86 NI X11 : agt ( message )
87 NI X12 : message
88 NI X13 : key ( message )
89 NI X14 : keyResp ( agt ( message ) , key ( message ) )
90 NI X15 : crypt (message ,
91 keyResp ( agt ( message ) , key ( message ) ) )
92 NI X16 : agt ( message )
93 NI X17 : message
94 NI X18 : key ( message )
95 NI X19 : keyResp ( agt ( message ) , key ( message ) )
96 NI X20 : crypt (message ,
97 keyResp ( agt ( message ) , key ( message ) ) )
98 NI X21 : keyReq ( s r c ( message ) , t r g t ( message ) )
99%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
100 s e c t i o n i n i t s :
101%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
102 i n i t i a l s t a t e i n i t :=
103 s t a t e S (0 , pk , ks , inv ( ks ) ,
104 keyReq ( s r c (dummy) , t r g t (dummy) ) ,
105 s r c (dummy) ,dummy,
106 t r g t (dummy) ,dummy,
107 s r c (dummy) , t r g t (dummy) ,
108 keyReq ( s r c (dummy) , t r g t (dummy) ) ,
109 agt (dummy) ,dummy, key (dummy) ,
110 keyResp ( agt (dummy) , key (dummy) ) ,
111 crypt (dummy,
112 keyResp ( agt (dummy) , key (dummy) ) ) ,
113 agt (dummy) ,dummy, key (dummy) ,
114 keyResp ( agt (dummy) , key (dummy) ) ,
115 crypt (dummy,
116 keyResp ( agt (dummy) , key (dummy) ) ) ,
117 keyReq ( s r c (dummy) , t r g t (dummy) ) )
118 . iknows ( getKey )
119%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
120 s e c t i o n r u l e s :
121%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
122 s tep s t ep 01 S (X0 ,X1 ,X2 ,X3 ,X4 ,X5 ,X6 ,X7 ,
123 X8 ,X9 ,X10 ,X11 ,X12 ,X13 ,X14 ,X15 ,X16 ,X17 ,
124 X18 ,X19 ,X20 , NI X3 , NI X4 , NI X5 , NI X6 ,
125 NI X7 , NI X8 , NI X9 , NI X10 , NI X11 , NI X12 ,
126 NI X13 , NI X14 , NI X15 , NI X16 , NI X17 ,
127 NI X18 , NI X19 , NI X20 , NI X21 ) :=
128 s t a t e S (0 ,X0 ,X1 ,X2 , NI X3 , NI X4 ,
129 NI X5 , NI X6 , NI X7 , NI X8 , NI X9 ,
130 NI X10 , NI X11 , NI X12 , NI X13 ,
131 NI X14 , NI X15 , NI X16 , NI X17 ,
132 NI X18 , NI X19 , NI X20 , NI X21 )
133 . iknows (msg( par (X5) , opt ( getKey ) ,
134 pld (X3 ) ) )
135 &equal (X4 , p1 keyReq (X3) )
136 &equal (X5 , p1 s r c (X4) )
137 &equal (X6 , p2 keyReq (X3) )
138 &equal (X7 , p1 t r g t (X6) )
139 &equal (X8 , s r c (X7) )
140 &equal (X9 , t r g t (X5) )
141 &equal (X10 , keyReq (X8 ,X9) )
142 &equal (X11 , agt (X7) )
143 &equal (X12 , apply (X0 ,X7) )
144 &equal (X13 , key (X12 ) )
145 &equal (X14 , keyResp (X11 , X13 ) )
146 &equal (X15 , crypt (X2 , X14 ) )
147 &equal (X16 , agt (X5) )
148 &equal (X17 , apply (X0 ,X5) )
149 &equal (X18 , key (X17 ) )
150 &equal (X19 , keyResp (X16 , X18 ) )
151 &equal (X20 , crypt (X2 , X19 ) )
152 =>
153 s t a t e S (1 ,X0 ,X1 ,X2 ,X3 ,X4 ,X5 ,X6 ,X7 ,X8 ,
154 X9 ,X10 ,X11 ,X12 ,X13 ,X14 ,X15 ,X16 ,X17 ,
155 X18 ,X19 ,X20 , NI X21 )
156 s tep s t ep 02 S (X0 ,X1 ,X2 ,X3 ,X4 ,X5 ,X6 ,X7 ,
157 X8 ,X9 ,X10 ,X11 ,X12 ,X13 ,X14 ,X15 ,X16 ,X17 ,
158 X18 ,X19 ,X20 , NI X21 ) :=
159 s t a t e S (1 ,X0 ,X1 ,X2 ,X3 ,X4 ,X5 ,X6 ,X7 ,X8 ,
160 X9 ,X10 ,X11 ,X12 ,X13 ,X14 ,X15 ,X16 ,X17 ,
161 X18 ,X19 ,X20 , NI X21 )
162 =>
163 s t a t e S (2 ,X0 ,X1 ,X2 ,X3 ,X4 ,X5 ,X6 ,X7 ,X8 ,
164 X9 ,X10 ,X11 ,X12 ,X13 ,X14 ,X15 ,X16 ,X17 ,
165 X18 ,X19 ,X20 , NI X21 )
166 . iknows (msg( par (X5) , opt ( getKey ) , pld (X15 ) ) )
167 s tep s t ep 03 S (X0 ,X1 ,X2 ,X3 ,X4 ,X5 ,X6 ,X7 ,
168 X8 ,X9 ,X10 ,X11 ,X12 ,X13 ,X14 ,X15 ,X16 ,X17 ,
169 X18 ,X19 ,X20 , NI X21 , X21) :=
170 s t a t e S (2 ,X0 ,X1 ,X2 ,X3 ,X4 ,X5 ,X6 ,X7 ,X8 ,
171 X9 ,X10 ,X11 ,X12 ,X13 ,X14 ,X15 ,X16 ,X17 ,
172 X18 ,X19 ,X20 , NI X21 )
173 . iknows (msg( par (X7) , opt ( getKey ) , pld (X21 ) ) )
174 &equal (X10 , X21)
175 =>
176 s t a t e S (3 ,X0 ,X1 ,X2 ,X3 ,X4 ,X5 ,X6 ,X7 ,X8 ,
177 X9 ,X10 ,X11 ,X12 ,X13 ,X14 ,X15 ,X16 ,X17 ,
178 X18 ,X19 ,X20 , X21)
179 s tep s t ep 04 S (X0 ,X1 ,X2 ,X3 ,X4 ,X5 ,X6 ,X7 ,
180 X8 ,X9 ,X10 ,X11 ,X12 ,X13 ,X14 ,X15 ,X16 ,X17 ,
181 X18 ,X19 ,X20 , X21) :=
182 s t a t e S (3 ,X0 ,X1 ,X2 ,X3 ,X4 ,X5 ,X6 ,X7 ,X8 ,
183 X9 ,X10 ,X11 ,X12 ,X13 ,X14 ,X15 ,X16 ,X17 ,
184 X18 ,X19 ,X20 , X21)
185 =>
186 s t a t e S (4 ,X0 ,X1 ,X2 ,X3 ,X4 ,X5 ,X6 ,X7 ,X8 ,
187 X9 ,X10 ,X11 ,X12 ,X13 ,X14 ,X15 ,X16 ,X17 ,
188 X18 ,X19 ,X20 , X21)
189 . iknows (msg( par (X7) , opt ( getKey ) , pld (X20 ) ) )
190 . iknows (execOK)
191%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
192 s e c t i o n goa l s :
193%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
194 a t t a c k s t a t e executionOK () :=
195 iknows (execOK)
